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Those inclined to conspiracy theories and/or consumed by Cold War-era 
russophobia, will fi nd this book a compelling read, especially if they know 
nothing about Georgia. Already it has captivated the usual suspects. Senator 
John McCain who, at the time of the events described herein, produced the 
unforgettable (albeit misguided) comment: ‘We are all Georgians now!’, deems 
it ‘required reading’ (dust-jacket). Strobe Talbott also lends endorsement with 
a short Preface.
Asmus, who died on 30 April 2011 but who was Executive Director of the 
Brussels-based Transatlantic Centre at the time of this book’s composition, 
hatches a simple plot, though his inability to spell correctly the name of South 
Ossetia’s president (Kokoiti, not Koikoty) calls into question his regional 
expertise. 
The Kremlin (pre-eminently Vladimir Putin), irritated by Georgian 
President Mikheil Saak’ashvili’s virulent anti-Russian, pro-Western stance 
and angered at the West’s recognition of Kosovo, decided to punish Georgia 
once the Bucharest NATO meeting (April 2008) resolved to consider offering 
Georgia (and Ukraine) a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at its next 
(December) meeting. This had to be stopped. The West ignored warnings, as 
provocations intensifi ed in South Ossetia to trap the impulsive Saak’ashvili 
into taking the bait and starting a war, thereby giving Russia the excuse it 
needed to attack and maybe even capture Tbilisi; in any event, Saak’ashvili’s 
humiliation would be such that his government would collapse. Russian 
military might was ready (though perhaps Saak’ashvili’s order to attack late 
on 7 August caught it on the hop), and Tbilisi was duly taught its lesson. With 
George Bush leaving peace negotiations in the hands of French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy, whilst the Georgian capital and government were saved, the 
ceasefi re was unjust. The lesson of all this? The US and Europe should 
‘recommit to building democracy in Georgia and fi nding new ways to tie 
Tbilisi [. . .] to the West’ (p. 234).
If this includes implementation of the recommendation to ‘work with 
NATO allies in crafting a comprehensive, transparent approach to security 
assistance and military sales in the region’ (‘Striking the Balance: US Policy 
and Stability in Georgia’, report to the US Committee on Foreign Relations 
of 22 December 2009), this will only reprise the recklessness that fuelled 
Saak’ashvili’s pre-war appetite for weaponry and lead to further bloodshed.
I agree with Asmus in two respects: the West unwisely neglected the 
Caucasus (preoccupied, as in the mid-nineteenth century, with Balkan dilem-
mas) and behaved foolishly at Bucharest. But Asmus’s arguments are fl awed. 
NATO membership for Georgia should never have been contemplated. 
Once tabled, it should have been rejected, but the compromise forced by the 
obstinacy of former Eastern Bloc members, carrying their own anti-Russian 
agendas, virtually guaranteed confl ict before December, given Saak’ashvili’s 
desperation to reestablish control over the disputed territories (both to satisfy 
NATO and to fulfi l election pledges). Asmus dismisses the idea that the origins 
of the 2008 fi ghting lie in the ethnic rivalries with the Abkhazians and South 
Ossetians (p. 215), both of whom are ritualistically derided as Russia’s pawns. 
I beg to differ. Saak’ashvili and his then Minister of Defence, the half-Ossetian 
Irak’li Okruashvili, had moved against South Ossetia in 2004. In 2006, 
contrary to the 1994 Moscow ceasefi re, he stationed troops in Abkhazia’s 
Upper K’odor Valley, and there is ample evidence, even admitted by Asmus, 
that plans for attacks on both regions had long been devised; Abkhazia 
expected an incursion in May 2008. If the Americans, who (Asmus constantl y 
reiterates) took every opportunity to warn Saak’ashvili not to pursue the 
military option, and Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt (p. 143) knew of these 
plans, is it not reasonable to assume that the Russians also knew and, given 
their internationally sanctioned peace-keeping roles in both disputed regions, 
would take precautions (e.g. upgrading southern Abkhazia’s railtrack, as 
happened in the spring of 2008, to ensure speedy access to the border, or 
holding an army nearby across the mountains)? Asmus detects sinister motives 
in Russia’s military exercises in the North Caucasus prior to the confl agration 
but says nothing of Georgia’s participation in NATO manoeuvres that 
summer (and earlier). Brigadier-General Mamuk’a Q’urashvili’s statement 
(evening 7 August), widely interpreted as letting Saak’ashvili’s cat out of the 
bag, that Tbilisi’s goal was ‘to restore constitutional order in the whole region’ 
(namely, South Ossetia) is excused by Asmus as the misspoken utterance of a 
fi eld-general confused by having a microphone thrust under his nose (p. 39).
Everyone, even Asmus, accepts that the Georgians fi red the fi rst shots, 
thereby initiating the confl ict, though the world was quick to accept 
Saak’ashvili’s charge that he was responding to Russian aggression, a claim 
energetically disseminated by Randy Scheunemann’s PR fi rm, Mercury Group 
(coincidentally Senator McCain’s agency), contracted to spin Georgia’s case 
to the world — on this Asmus is silent. Ever ready with excuses, Asmus says 
that the provocations were such that Saak’ashvili had no alternative. Even 
allowing this allegation to be true, if the result of submitting to provocation is 
death and destruction followed by crushing military defeat, is it not more 
sensible not to be provoked? And if Saak’ashvili was deluded into thinking 
that the 7th Cavalry would ride to his rescue, then the US authorities should 
seriously ask themselves why he might have harboured such fantasies. Without 
Saak’ashvili’s fateful decision, it is inconceivable that the Russians would have 
acted against Georgia, but if their goal had been to take Tbilisi and oust 
Saak’ashvili, does Asmus really think that they would not have done it? 
And if war was the aim, why did Vitalii Churkin, Russia’s UN Ambassador, 
summon an extraordinary meeting of the Security Council at 05.15 GMT 
on 8 August to consider a ceasefi re, only for the USA (with predictable UK 
backing) to block the call? Asmus never mentions this.
Had Russia not responded, Abkhazia would undoubtedly have been the 
next target. Instead, the opportunity was taken to expel the Georgian troops 
from their illegal deployment in the K’odor Valley, which was achieved with 
only one (Abkhazian) fatality; incidentally, Abkhazian ground forces alone 
made the ascent. Asmus claims that Russia had 20,000 troops in Abkhazia, 
over double the true number. In disabling Georgia’s two military bases in 
Gori (near South Ossetia) and Senak’i (near Abkhazia) and in sinking the 
vessels that threatened Abkhazia from the port of Poti, Russia was only doing 
what military logic dictated — preventing Georgia from initiating further 
hostilities. Nicolai Petro (‘The Legal Case for Russian Intervention in 
Georgia’, Fordham International Law Journal, May 2009) argues that every aspect 
of Russia’s intervention conformed to international law and its peace-keeping 
mandate.
Georgia had effectively lost Abkhazia and South Ossetia years before 
Saak’ashvili’s presidency, but Saak’ashvili’s actions fi nally prompted Russia’s 
recognition of the republics (26 August 2008), thereby hammering the fi nal 
nail into the coffi n of Georgia’s vain hopes for reintegration and winning for 
Russia a permanent presence south of the mountains. The question now is: 
how to proceed with creating a peaceful and stable Transcaucasia to every-
one’s advantage? America and the West should also learn that, if they are 
going to engage successfully with understudied regions, they should familiarize 
themselves with all local nuances beforehand. Meddling in ignorance can lead 
to alliances with unsavoury (not to say buffoonish) characters. Pace McCain, 
Talbott, Brzezinski, Havel and Bildt, books like this do little to enlighten 
or encourage the learning of essential lessons but only serve to perpetuate 
dangerous myths.
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